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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses a sequence of litigation concerning attempts by Iraqi citizens to have the United 
Kingdom Government investigate their claims of ill-treatment and death by British soldiers during the 
six-year British occupation of Basra, Southern Iraq. This paper uses the litigation as a foil to examine 
broader issues arising from the extra-territorial application of the duty to effectively investigate rights 
violations under the European Convention on Human Rights, an unprecedented occurrence. 
Specifically, it compares the duty of effective investigation to comparative institutional responses to 
human rights violations in conflict. These mechanisms have developed a broader set of victim-
oriented objectives in dealing with violations and this paper argues the duty of effective investigation 
is comparatively deficient. It then looks at the manner in which the domestic courts have applied the 
duty, arguing that the various factors have driven the High Court to adopt a limited model of 
investigation. 
Key words: European Convention on Human Rights; Right to life; Right to freedom from torture and 
ill-treatment; Duty of effective investigation  
 
I Introduction 
In March 2013, in R (Mousa) v Secretary of State for Defence (Mousa (No 2)),1 the United 
Kingdom High Court held that the manner by which the British government was executing its 
obligation to investigate cases of death and ill-treatment by British troops in Iraq was not in 
compliance with the standards of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Declining to order a single public inquiry as requested by the claimants’, the High Court 
ordered the government to restructure its pre-existing investigative mechanism, the Iraq 
Historic Claims Tribunal (IHAT), and provided an investigative model to guide the 
government in this task and to comply with the requirements of the ECHR. 
I argue that the model adopted by the High Court is a positive development in terms of its 
objective of identifying and potentially prosecuting individuals responsible for rights 
violations in Iraq. However, drawing from comparative institutional responses to severe 
rights violations in conflict I argue that the duty of effective investigation, as applied by the 
ECtHR and embodied in the High Court’s approach, neglects wider victim-oriented 
objectives, despite their adoption being supported by the case law.  
                                                            
1
 R (Mousa) v Secretary of State for Defence [2013] EWHC 1412 (Admin) [Mousa (No 2)]. 
2 
 
After setting out the previous investigations and litigation that preceded Mousa (No 2), this 
paper first analyses the ECtHR’s previous case law from Northern Ireland, Turkey and Russia 
concerning the requirements of effective investigations in conflict. It demonstrates that, 
notwithstanding the exigencies of conflict, the standards of investigation remain high and the 
investigative duty thus presents a strong mechanism for ensuring individual accountability for 
rights abuses in conflict. 
However, when assessed against comparative institutional approaches to rights violations that 
have incorporated objectives of victims’ needs and restorative justice – namely, comparative 
human rights law, truth commissions and international criminal law – the procedural duty is 
deficient in its primary focus on individual accountability. Accordingly, when the duty of 
effective investigation is considered in relation to the nature of allegations faced in the Iraq 
investigations, which include “murder, manslaughter, the wilful infliction of serious bodily 
injury, sexual indignities, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and large scale violation of 
international humanitarian law”,
2
 I argue that principles of victims’ needs and restorative 
justice have a role to play. 
The final part of this paper demonstrates that domestic United Kingdom case law supports a 
victim-oriented approach to investigating systemic rights violations like those in Iraq. The 
High Court however rejected a wider model of investigation in Mousa (No 2). This 
demonstrates the limitations in the extra-territorial application of the procedural duty by 
domestic courts. 
II Previous Investigations and the ECHR’s Legal Framework 
The claims considered in this paper sit against a detailed factual background and legal 
framework. In order to adequately consider the procedural duty – its standards, purposes and 
rationales – in Iraq and against comparative institutional responses to human rights 
violations, it is necessary to briefly introduce the litigation and other forms of investigation 
that have preceded the claims in Mousa (No 2). 
A An Introduction to the Al-Skeini and Mousa Litigation 
The Iraq investigations owe their existence to two interrelated strands of litigation which 
originate in the British government’s March 2004 announcement that it would not establish 
                                                            
2
 At [4]. 
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independent inquiries into the deaths of 113 Iraqi citizens, killed by British soldiers either 
during patrol or in detention.
3
 In the Al-Skeini litigation, relatives of the deceased applied for 
judicial review of the decision. Six test cases were chosen. Five concerned fatal shootings by 
soldiers on patrol while the sixth, Mr Baha Mousa, died following severe ill-treatment in 
British military custody. In 2007 the United kingdom House of Lords held that the ECHR’s 
extra-territorial jurisdiction did not extend to any of the deaths except, following a concession 
by the Secretary of State, that of Baha Mousa.
4
  In July 2011 the ECtHR held in Al-Skeini v 
United Kingdom that the ECHR applied extra-territorially to all the deaths and art 2 required 
an investigation in each case.
5
 
The Mousa litigation begins in September 2010, prior to the ECtHR’s Al-Skeini decision. In 
Mousa (No 1) the claimant, Mr Ali Zaki Mousa, represented 140 Iraqi citizens who alleged 
gross ill-treatment whilst in British military custody.
6
 Prior to commencement of the 
proceedings, the Government accepted that these allegations raised an arguable case of 
serious ill-treatment and established IHAT to investigate the claims. Mousa (No 1) is the 
claimants’ challenge to the Government’s investigative mechanism, IHAT, and an attempt to 
secure a full public inquiry. In November 2011 the Court of Appeal allowed the application, 
holding that IHAT lacked sufficient independence. Without determining the necessity of a 
full public inquiry the Court of Appeal ordered IHAT to be restructured.
7
  
Prior to the proceedings in Mousa (No 2), IHAT’s task increased immensely as a result of the 
ECtHR’s afore-mentioned judgment in Al-Skeini v United Kingdom, which held that the 
ECHR applied to certain instances of ill-treatment and death allegedly caused by British 
troops in Basra, Iraq, during the 2003–2009 occupation.
8
 IHAT was tasked with investigating 
these deaths as well as the ill-treatment cases. The number of deaths requiring investigation is 
estimated at 150 to 160, and those of ill-treatment to be as high as 800.
9
 
The High Court’s decision in Mousa (No 2) and its recently delivered follow-up decision that 
refines the nature of IHAT’s reformed investigations are discussed in detail below. 
                                                            
3
 At [10]. 
4 R (Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26, [2008] AC 153 at [6], [61] and [132]. 
5
 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2012) 53 EHRR 18 (Grand Chamber, ECHR). 
6
 R (Mousa) v Secretary of State for Defence [2010] EWHC 3304 (Admin), [2011] UKHRR 268 [Mousa (No 1) 
(HC)] at [1]. 
7 R (Mousa) v Secretary of State for Defence [2011] EWCA Civ 1334, [2012] HRLR 6 [Mousa (No 1) (CA)]. 
8
 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2012) 53 EHRR 18 (Grand Chamber, ECHR). 
9
 Mousa (No 2), above n 1, at [3]. 
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B Previous Inquiries 
In addition to the IHAT investigations, the United Kingdom Government has established two 
public inquiries into specific incidents that occurred during the British military’s time in 
Basra – the Baha Mousa Inquiry and the Al Sweady Inquiry. A combination of different types 
of investigation may satisfy the ECHR’s procedural obligation to investigate deaths and ill-
treatment.
10
 The scope, form and findings of these two inquiries therefore bear on the 
Government’s overall compliance with its procedural obligation in Iraq. 
The Baha Mousa Inquiry was established in May 2008 to inquire into the circumstances 
surrounding the death of a hotel receptionist, Mr Baha Mousa, and the treatment of others 
whilst detained in British custody in Basra, Iraq, in 2003. Its terms of reference additionally 
focused the inquiry on the particular military united involved in Mr Mousa’s death.
11
 The 
inquiry concluded with a three volume report, making 73 recommendations, published in 
September 2011.
12
 
The still on-going Al Sweady Inquiry was established to inquire into allegations of ill-
treatment and unlawful killings by British soldiers in Majar-al-Kabir, Iraq, in 2004, after the 
Government conceded it was necessary during judicial review proceedings commenced by 
the relatives of those detained and allegedly killed and ill-treated by British soldiers.
13
 Its 
terms of reference require investigation into allegations at issue in the judicial proceedings.
14
 
C Effective Investigations in the ECHR 
This section of the paper provides a general introduction to the obligations imposed by the 
ECHR’s art 2 and 3 procedural duty to effectively investigate certain cases of death and ill-
treatment. The practical operation of these standards is then given content by analysis of the 
duty’s application in Northern Ireland, Turkey and Russia in the following section. 
 
                                                            
10
 Discussed below at n 57. 
11  William Gage The Baha Mousa Public Inquiry Report (HC 1452–I, 8 September 2011) Vol I, at [1.4]; Mousa 
(No 1) (HC), above n 6, at [20].  
12
 William Gage The Baha Mousa Public Inquiry Report (HC 1452–III, 8 September 2011) vol III, at  1267–
1285. The Report is available at <http://www.bahamousainquiry.org/> 
13 R (Al Sweady) v Secretary of State for Defence [2009] EWHC 2387 (Admin), [2010] HRLR 2 at [11] 
14
 Mousa (No 1) (HC), above n 6, at [24]; see also Thayne Forbes “The Al Sweady Inquiry: Ruling Re: Terms of 
Reference” (12 March 2013) at [5] available at <http://www.alsweadyinquiry.org/>.  
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1 Article 2 and 3 Investigations  
Article 2(1) of the ECHR provides that “everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.”
15
 
The ECtHR has interpreted these words to impose on states a negative duty to refrain from 
the unlawful taking of life, and “also to take positive steps to protect the right to life in a 
variety of ways.”
16
 The primary, and general, positive obligation imposed on States is one of 
protection within reasonable means, and the ECtHR states:
17
 
… the first sentence of art 2(1) enjoins the state not only to refrain from the 
intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to 
safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. 
States must establish an effective framework of laws, procedures, precautions and 
enforcement machinery that deters, prevents and sanctions offences against the person.
18
 The 
framework of procedures and enforcement must include, where appropriate, means for 
criminal prosecution and civil redress.
19
 
This expansive obligation arises from the ECtHR’s “practical and effective” method of 
interpreting the ECHR,
20
 which aims to ensure the actual protection of ECHR rights and 
freedoms on the basis that “[s]tates cannot fulfil their duties under the Convention by simply 
remaining passive.”
21
 Where a death occurs in circumstances potentially engaging the state’s 
responsibility, art 2 imposes:
22
 
                                                            
15
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms CETS 5 (signed 4 November 
1950, entered into force 3 September 1953), art 2(1). 
16
 R (Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence [2010] UKSC 29, [2011] 1 AC 1 at [133].  
17
 Chief Constable of Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] AC 225 at [28]; Re McKerr 
[2004] UKHL 12, [2004] 1 WLR 807 at [19]; LCB v United Kingdom (1999) 27 EHRR 212 (ECHR) at [36]; 
and Osman v United Kingdom (1998) 29 EHRR 245 (Grand Chamber, ECHR) at [115]. 
18
 R (Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence, above n 16, at [201]; R (Humberstone) v Legal Services 
Commission [2010] EWCA Civ 1479, [2011] 1 WLR 1460 at [65] and [67]; Chief Constable of the 
Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle, above n 17, at [28]; R (Middleton) v West Somerset Coroner [2004] UKHL 
10, [2004] 2 AC 182 at [2]; Osman v United Kingdom, above n 17, at [115]; see further Juliet Chevalier-Watts 
“Effective Investigations under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Securing the Right to 
life or an Onerous Burden on a State?” (2010) 21(3) EJIL 701 at 702.  
19
 R (Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence, above n 16, at [203] per Lord Mance. 
20 R (Amin) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL 51, [2004] 1 AC 653 at [18]; Salman v 
Turkey (2002) 34 EHRR 425 (Grand Chamber, ECHR) at [97]; Jordan v United Kingdom (2001) 37 EHRR 52 
(Section III, ECHR) at [102]; and Đlhan v Turkey (2002) 34 EHRR 36 (Grand Chamber, ECHR) at [91]. 
21
 Alistair Mowbray “The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights” (2005) 5(1) HRL Rev 57 at 78; 
see also Chevalier-Watts “Effective Investigations under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights”, above n 18, at 703. 
22
 Öneryildiz v Turkey (2004) 39 EHRR 12 (Grand Chamber, ECHR) at [91]. 
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… a duty for the state to ensure by all means at its disposal, an adequate 
response – judicial or otherwise – so that the legislative or administrative 
framework set up to protect the right to life is properly implement. 
This gives rise to the second positive obligation imposed by art 2 – the right to an effective 
investigation. This procedural obligation is inextricably intertwined with the primary positive 
obligation to protect. The necessary legal framework must ensure an “independent and 
impartial investigation procedure that satisfies certain minimum standards as to 
effectiveness.”
23
 The ECtHR implied the procedural obligation in the case of McCann v 
United Kingdom (McCann) “in order to make sure that [the substantive obligation] is 
effective in practice”.
24
 McCann concerned the fatal shooting of three terrorist suspects by 
British military Special Forces in Gibraltar. In reading the procedural duty into art 2, the 
ECtHR stated:
25
  
… a general legal prohibition of arbitrary killing by the agents of the State 
would be ineffective, in practice, if there existed no procedure for reviewing 
the lawfulness of the use of lethal force by State authorities. The obligation 
to protect the right to life … read in conjunction with the State’s general 
duty under Article 1 … requires by implication that there should be some 
form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as 
a result of the use of force by, inter alios, agents of the state. 
McCann established that alleged violations of the right to life required strict scrutiny and 
review.
26
 This standard of review applied to the procedures and investigation following death, 
and, as stressed by the ECtHR, the broader circumstances of a death.
27
 The procedural 
obligation is most stringent in circumstances where, like those in the Mousa litigation, persons 
                                                            
23
 Öneryildiz v Turkey, above n 22, at [94]; Jordan v United Kingdom, above n 20, at [105]–[109]; and Edwards 
v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 487 (Section III, ECHR) at [69]–[71]. 
24 McCann v United Kingdom (1995) 21 EHRR 97 (Grand Chamber, ECHR) at [161]; See generally Al-Skeini v 
United Kingdom, above n 5, at [163]; R (Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence, above n 16, at [200] per Lord 
Mance; R (Middleton) v West Somerset Coroner, above n 18, at [5]. 
25
 McCann v United Kingdom, above n 24, at [161]. 
26 Fionnuala Ni Aolain “Truth telling, accountability and the right to life in Northern Ireland” (2002) 5 EHRLR 
572 at 577. 
27
 At 577. 
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have been killed by state agents’ use of force.
28
 The essential purpose of investigation, as 
commonly phrased by the ECtHR, is to:
29
 
… secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws safeguarding 
the right to life, and in those cases involving State agents or bodies, to ensure 
their accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility. 
In order to be considered effective, the investigation must be “capable of leading to the 
determination of whether the particular force used was or was not justified in the 
circumstances and to the identification and punishment of those responsible.”
30
 This includes 
the existence of justification for an individual state agent’s use of force, to responsibility for 
any systemic failure to protect life.
31
 Defects that undermine the capacity for identification of 
the responsible parties breach this standard.
32
   
Article 3 also imposes an obligation to ensure that there is an effective, prompt and 
independent investigation into claims of ill-treatment in violation of art 3. As with the 
procedural duty under art 2, the ECtHR implied this obligation by interpreting art 3 in 
conjunction with the obligation owed by States in art 1 to “secure to everyone within [their] 
jurisdiction” ECHR rights.
33
 Equally, an investigation under art 3 must be:
34
 
… capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those 
responsible. Otherwise, the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman 
and degrading treatment and punishment would, despite its fundamental 
importance, be ineffective in practice and it would be possible in some cases 
for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with 
virtual impunity. 
                                                            
28 McCann v United Kingdom, above n 24, at [161]. 
29
 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom, above n 5, at [163]; Nachova v Bulgaria (2006) 42 EHRR 43 (Grand Chamber, 
ECHR) at [110]; and Jordan v United Kingdom, above n 20, at [105]. 
30 Ramsahai v Netherlands (2008) 46 EHRR 43 (Grand Chamber, ECHR) at [321]; and Nachova v Bulgaria, 
above n 29, at [113]. 
31
 R (Hurst) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolist [2007] UKHL 726, [2007] 2 WLR 726 at [28]. 
32
 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom, above n 5, at [166]; Bazorkina v Russia (69481/01)  Section I, ECHR 26 July 
2006 at [118]. 
33
 Özkan v Turkey (21689/93) Section II, ECHR 6 April 2004 at [358]. 
34
 Assenov v Bulgaria (1999) 28 EHRR 652 (ECHR) at [102]. 
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A failure to undertake an investigation where a claimant raises an arguable case of ill-
treatment breaches art 3.
35
 Though the ECtHR has indicated investigations into allegations of 
ill-treatment fall to be dealt with under art 13, the ECHR’s remedial provision,
36
 more 
recently the ECtHR has applied a similar scope to the investigative duties under articles 2 and 
3.
37
 Accordingly, the essential requirements of an ECHR compliant effective investigation 
under arts 2 and 3 are the same.
38
 
In order to be considered effective an investigation must satisfy a number of criteria. Once 
aware of a death falling within art 2 or arguable ill-treatment in breach of art 3, state 
authorities must proactively investigate and cannot wait for next of kin to request 
investigation.
39
 That investigation must be reasonably expeditious and prompt.
40
 More 
broadly, the legal system must operate expeditiously in practice so that the courts may 
complete a timely examination of each case’s individual merits.
41
 The reasonable expedition 
requirement is vital to both ensuring public confidence in state authorities’ compliance with 
the rule of law and in order to preclude the perception of State tolerance of or collusion in 
unlawful acts.
42
 
The body responsible for the investigation must be independent of the persons involved in the 
death.
43
 This entails institutional, hierarchical and practical independence.
44
 The ECtHR has 
held this standard to have been breached where, for instance, an investigation is carried out 
by the colleagues of the implicated party.
45
 Independent supervision of such an investigation 
is also insufficient.
46
 
                                                            
35
 Selmouni v France (2000) 29 EHRR 403 (Grand Chamber, ECHR) at [79]; see also Richard Clayton and 
Hugh Tomlinson (eds) The Law of Human Rights (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford) vol 1 at [8.74]–
[8.76]. 
36
 Đlhan v Turkey, above n 20, at [92]–[93]. 
37
 David Harris and others (eds) Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (2nd ed, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2009) at 109–110. 
38 DJ v Croatia (42418/10) Section I, ECHR 24 July 2012 at [85]; Mousa (No 1) (CA), above n 7, at [12]–[13].  
39 Jordan v United Kingdom, above n 20, at [105]; Edwards v United Kingdom, above n 23, at [69]. 
40
 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom, above n 5, at [167]; Isayeva v Russia (2005) 41 EHRR 38 (Section I, ECHR) at 
[213]. 
41 Calvelli v Italy (32967/96) Grand Chamber, ECHR 17 January 2002 at [53]. 
42
 Isayeva v Russia, above n 40 at [213]; Jordan v United Kingdom, above n 20, at [213]. 
43
 Bazorkina v Russia, above n 32, at [118]; Nachova v Bulgaria, above n 29, at [112]. 
44
 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom, above n 5, at [167]; Ramsahai v Netherlands, above n 30, at [325]; McKerr v 
United Kingdom (2002) 24 EHRR 20 (Section III, ECHR) at [128]. 
45
 Ramsahai v Netherlands, above n 30, at [337]. 
46
 Ramsahai v Netherlands, above n 30, at [337]; McKerr v United Kingdom, above n 44, at [128]. 
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The investigative duty is an obligation of means, not result, and its content varies according 
to circumstance.
47
 State authorities must take steps reasonably open to them to secure 
relevant evidence.
48
 This includes “eye-witness testimony, forensic evidence and, where 
appropriate, an autopsy which provides a complete and accurate record of injury and an 
objective analysis of clinical findings, including cause of death.”
49
 
All this must occur by means of a public investigation that is subject to sufficient public 
scrutiny.
50
 As with the other standards of investigation, this requirement is to ensure public 
confidence in state agents’ adherence to the rule of law and provide accountability not only in 
theory, but practice.
51
 The requisite level of public scrutiny varies with circumstance, but 
must preclude the risk of a cover-up by state authorities.
52
 Additionally, next of kin must be 
involved in the processes of investigation to the “extent necessary to safeguard his or her 
legitimate interests”.
53
 This can include access to the investigation and court documents or 
notification of decisions whether to prosecute,
54
 or access to investigation files and provision 
of a reasoned decision following appeal proceedings where the decision to not prosecute the 
Police officer responsible for a death is challenged.
55
 
These minimum standards allow a degree of flexibility.
56
 In addition, when the procedural 
obligation is triggered, it is wise to keep in mind that it may be satisfied by different forms of 
investigation – including inquests, public inquiry and criminal proceedings, whether alone or 
in combination – so long as these minimum standards are met.
57
 These are the minimum 
standards of investigation. The next part of this paper examines these standards in practice 
where the investigation duty has been applied to deaths and ill-treatment during conflict. 
 
                                                            
47
 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom, above n 5, at [166]; Ramsahai v Netherlands, above n 30, at [324]; R (Goodson) 
v HM Coroner for Bedfordshire & Luton [2004] EWHC 2931 (Admin), [2006] 1 WLR 432 at [59(iv)]. 
48
 Bazorkina v Russia, above n 32, at [118]. 
49 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom, above n 5, at [166]. 
50 Ramsahai v Netherlands, above n 30, at [321]; Nachova v Bulgaria, above n 29, at [140]; Isayeva v Russia, 
above n 40, at [213]. 
51
 Ramsahai v Netherlands, above n 30, at [321] and [353];  Nachova v Bulgaria, above n 29, at [140]. 
52 Ramsahai v Netherlands, above n 30, at [354]. 
53
 Jordan v United Kingdom, above n 18, at [109]. 
54
 At [109]. 
55
 Ramsahai v Netherlands, above n 30, at [354]. 
56 R (D) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 143, [2006] 3 All ER 946 at [10]; R 
(Goodson) v HM Coroner for Bedfordshire & Luton, above n 47, at [68]. 
57
 R (Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence, above n 16, at [205]. 
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III The Procedural Duty at War  
The investigative duty is born out of conflict. McCann concerned the deaths of Irish 
Republican Army members in Gibraltar. Much of Strasbourg’s jurisprudence concerning the 
procedural duty concerns anti-insurgency operations conducted by military and security 
forces in Russia, Turkey and Northern Ireland. This section demonstrates that, 
notwithstanding the exigencies of conflict, the standard of investigation required by arts 2 and 
3 remains high. 
A Investigations in Northern Ireland 
The key Northern Ireland cases are a quintet concerning alleged violations of art 2 by Police 
and Military forces in the 1980s. In each of the four joined cases – Jordan, Kelly, McKerr and 
Shanaghan v United Kingdom – the ECtHR applied the same procedural standards and 
unanimously held that the deceased’s right to life had been violated by the state’s failure to 
conduct an effective investigation.
58
 
In each case the ECtHR criticised pervasive defects in Northern Ireland’s institutional 
processes for the investigation of deaths. The initial Police investigations into each death 
lacked independence.
59
 The Director of Public Prosecution’s decisions to refrain from 
prosecution, based on defective Police investigations, were thus tainted and made without 
public scrutiny.
60
 Subsequent inquests were also defective in many respects. Individually and 
collectively these procedural elements failed to satisfy art 2.  
The ECtHR severely criticised the Coroner’s inquest procedure in each case.
 
Inquests were 
delayed,
61
 one for ten years before its ultimate abandonment.
62
 The inability to compel 
testimony by responsible officers prevented determination of the facts and legality of the use 
                                                            
58 Jordan v United Kingdom, above n 20, at [105]–[109]; McKerr v United Kingdom, above n 44, at [111]–
[115]; Kelly v United Kingdom (30054/96) Section III, ECHR 4 May 2001 at [91]–[98]; Shanaghan v United 
Kingdom (37715/97) Section III, ECHR 4 May 2001 at [88]–[92]; See generally Fionnuala Ni Aolain “Truth 
telling, accountability and the right to life in Northern Ireland”, above n 26, at 572–590.  
59 Jordan v United Kingdom, above n 20, at [120]; Kelly v United Kingdom, above n 58, at [114]–[115]; McKerr 
v United Kingdom, above n 44, at [128]; Shanaghan v United Kingdom, above n 58, at [105]. 
60
 Jordan v United Kingdom, above n 20, at [122]–[124]; Kelly v United Kingdom, above n 58, at [116]–[118]; 
McKerr v United Kingdom, above n 44, at [130]–[132]; Shanaghan v United Kingdom, above n 58, at [108]. 
61 Jordan v United Kingdom, above n 20, at [140]; Kelly v United Kingdom, above n 58, at [134]; Shanaghan v 
United Kingdom, above n 58, at [119]. 
62
 McKerr v United Kingdom, above n 44, at [152]–[155]. 
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of force.
63
 Victim’s families were not provided legal aid or witness statements, preventing 
their effective participation.
64
 Finally, inquests could not provide a verdict of “unlawful 
death”, which would require the DPP to reconsider their decision not to prosecute, precluding 
any contribution to the “identification or prosecution of any criminal offences”.
65
  
The ECtHR affirmed the wider object of procedural protection – requiring processes that 
protect and ensure rights – inherent in the procedural duty. In McKerr v United Kingdom, 
forced delays and attempts to conceal information cast legitimate doubt on the process’s 
integrity, from investigation to trial.
66
 In such cases, art 2 demanded wider scrutiny of these 
matters to ensure the criminal trial had not been undermined.
67
 Breach of the procedural duty 
followed where the successive inquest could not assess these wider matters.
68
 
In all cases the ECtHR lamented the pernicious effect the climate of closed justice which 
engendered these defects had on the procedural duty’s broader rationales. Procedural 
ineffectiveness and opacity obstructed the object of defusing public perception of state agents’ 
impunity.
69
 Inquests could not examine credible allegations of collusion between security 
forces and state agents.
70
 Non-disclosure of the reasons for deciding killings were lawful 
undermined public confidence in state authorities’ adherence to the rule of law.
71
 Overall, the 
institutional structure, antithetical to aims of open justice, lacked the capacity to “safeguard 
against the dangers of introspective investigations leading to secret reports.”
72
 
The ECtHR used this jurisprudence to emphasise the importance of four principles that carry 
through the case-law: expediency, independence, official sanction and openness.
73
 Each goes 
to the investigative duty’s role in ensuring public confidence in state accountability, 
                                                            
63
 Jordan v United Kingdom, above n 20, at [127]; Kelly v United Kingdom, above n 58, at [137]; and McKerr v 
United Kingdom, above n 44, at [144]. 
64 Jordan v United Kingdom, above n 20, at [134]; McKerr v United Kingdom, above n 44, at [147]–[148]; and 
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adherence to the rule of law, and state authorities’ use of lethal force. Finally, emergency 
circumstances did not alter the ECtHR’s application of the investigative duty. Conversely, the 
ECtHR criticised the precise procedural elements that had been created to respond to the 
exigencies of the Northern Ireland conflict. Implicit in the ECtHR’s approach is that, 
notwithstanding the difficulties presented by internal armed conflict, “general principles of 
accountability could not be disregarded.”
74
 
B Inadequate Investigations in South-East Turkey 
The ECtHR’s jurisprudence on Turkey provides further insight into the standards of 
investigation that must be met when a state’s armed forces cause civilian deaths. Emerging 
from the conflict between paramilitary forces and the State in South-Eastern Turkey in the 
1990s, in these cases, the ECtHR has considered factual circumstances ranging from killings 
during violent protests,
75
 to large-scale military assaults.
76
 As in Northern Ireland, a 
significant characteristic of these cases is the ECtHR’s refusal to dilute the standards of 
effective investigation in light of the frequency of armed clashes and high number of 
fatalities.
77
  
In this jurisprudence’s formative case, Kaya v Turkey, there was insufficient evidence before 
the ECtHR to establish that the applicant’s brother had been unlawfully killed by Turkish 
security forces during military operations.
78
 Notwithstanding, the ECtHR found the brother’s 
right to life had been violated for lack of an effective investigation into his death.
79 
Conceptually, and as elaborated below, this is significant for the retrospective manner it 
secures the victim’s substantive right to life.
80
 For present purposes, Kaya v Turkey’s 
significance lies in the ECtHR’s reception of the Government’s submission that the 
requirements of investigation could “legitimately be reduced to a minimum” because it was 
plain the brother’s death was a result of the security forces lawful use of force during military 
operations.
81
 In unequivocal terms the ECtHR rejected this submission and asserted the 
importance of investigation for ensuring the procedural protection of the right to life and the 
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accountability of state agents.
82
 Regarding the Government’s submission seeking the dilution 
of the investigative obligation to accommodate difficult security situations, the ECtHR 
stated:
83
 
… neither the prevalence of violent armed clashes nor the high incidence of 
fatalities can displace the obligation under art 2 to ensure that an effective, 
independent investigation is conducted into the deaths arising out of clashes 
involving  the security forces, more so in cases such as the present where the 
circumstances are in many respects unclear. 
The ECtHR accordingly held that the public prosecutor’s unquestioning acceptance of the 
military’s explanation that the brother was a terrorist, failure to take statements from relevant 
soldiers, collect scene evidence, and conduct an autopsy led to a violation of art 2.
84
  
In subsequent cases, and applying the standard principles and purposes of the investigative 
duty,
85
 the ECtHR has affirmed that the prevalence of armed conflict in South-East Turkey 
did not preclude the duty to investigate killings and ill-treatment.
86
 In this jurisprudence the 
ECtHR has criticised the investigating Public prosecutor’s subservience to state agents’ 
explanations for killings and ill-treatment,
87
 failure to even consider possible State agent 
involvement and responsibility for killings,
88
 and lack of independent capacity to initiate 
prosecutions.
89
 The ECtHR has found repetitive failures to identify and interview state agents 
responsible for killings,
90
 as well as to conduct ballistics tests and autopsies.
91
 Administrative 
investigations were found to be equally defective. Lacking institutional independence from 
the security forces being investigated,
92
 they similarly failed to conduct necessary autopsies or 
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ballistics tests,
93
 question members of security forces involved in operations or investigate 
clear circumstances of ill-treatment by security forces.
94
 Regarding victim participation, 
victims and their relatives have not been provided with case files and excluded from judicial 
proceedings, precluding their ability to appeal adverse civil claims.
95
 Finally, the ECtHR 
found violations of the right to an effective investigation under art 13 where defective 
criminal investigations rendered recourse to civil remedies equally ineffective.
96
 
In these cases the ECtHR’s scrutiny has extended to criticism of failures to investigate 
whether military operations had been properly conducted,
97
 to soldier’s failures to verify 
civilian casualties following operations.
98
 Most significantly, the ECtHR rejected the 
Government’s submissions for a weakened standard of investigation during conflict, stating 
that such an approach “would exacerbate still further the climate of impunity and insecurity in 
the region and thus create a violent circle.”
99
 However, this jurisprudence has also elicited 
criticism of the ECtHR that, “One of the ECtHR’s weaknesses has been its lack of attention to 
the truth and acknowledgement in its approach to remedies … international organisations 
should have insisted on public acknowledgement of state violence.”
100
 Both of these elements, 
a strong approach to ensuring investigations capable of determining individual accountability 
for violations of arts 2 and 3, but a failure to consider wider victim-friendly objectives, carry 
through the ECtHR’s case law, and are considered below in relation to comparative 
institutional responses to human rights violations in conflict. 
The ECtHR’s approach in this case-law from Turkey has especially influenced the next body 
of procedural duty case law considered, that concerning allegations of arts 2 and 3 violations 
by Russian military forces in Chechnya.
101
 
C Ineffective Investigations in the Land of Minerals 
The Russian cases concern the second civil war in Chechnya, which began in October 1999 
between Russian military forces and Chechen rebel forces of the separatist regime established 
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following the First Chechen War in 1996.
102
 This jurisprudence further develops the 
principles applied in the ECtHR’s Turkish case law. 
The ECtHR has considered incidents of Russian military forces extra-judicially executing 
applicants’ family members during military operations.
 103 
It has also heard a claim involving 
the Russian air force’s indiscriminate bombing of civilian vehicle convoys following the 
military’s promise it would allow civilians safe passage.
104
 Similarly the ECtHR has heard 
claims concerning the bombing of civilians as they attempted to escape their villages along a 
nearby roadway.
105 
Other aspects of the conflict considered include the targeted abduction of 
individuals from their homes, the security forces’ use of shelling and bombing, and large-
scale “sweeping up” operations where civilians were killed or detained during purported 
searches for insurgents.
106
 
In these cases the ECtHR has acknowledged the Russian authorities’ right to respond to the 
emergency situation, commonly commenting to the effect:
107
 
… that the situation that existed in Chechnya at the relevant time called for 
exceptional measures by the State in order to regain control over the 
Republic and to suppress the illegal armed insurgency. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of an express derogation from the ECHR under art 15 or 
declaration of martial law by the Russian Government, the ECtHR has assessed Russian 
military operations in Chechnya “against the normal legal background.”
108
 As such, the 
ECtHR has assessed the investigations undertaken by the Russian authorities, or lack of, 
against the procedural duty’s conventional purposes and standards.
109
 In relation to the 
difficulties imposed by conflict, the ECtHR has commonly noted that though various 
obstacles may be presented to investigating authorities, a prompt investigation into the “use of 
lethal force may generally be regarded as essential in ensuring public confidence in the 
                                                            
102
 Joseph Barrett “Chechnya’s Last Hope? Enforced Disappearances and the European Court of Human Rights” 
(2009) 22 Harv Hum Rts J 133 at 133. 
103 Khashiyev and Akayeva v Russia (2006) 42 EHRR 20 (Section I, ECHR) at [13]–[27]. 
104
 Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v Russia (2005) 41 EHRR 39 (Section I, ECHR) at [13]–[34]. 
105
 Isayeva v Russia, above n 40, at [17]. 
106 See Philip Leach “The Chechen conflict: analysing the oversight of the European Court of Human Rights” 
(2008) 6 EHRLR 732–761 at 733. 
107
 Kerimova v Russia (17170/04) Section I, ECHR 3 May 2011 at [246]; Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v 
Russia, above n 104, at [180]; and Isayeva v Russia, above n 40, at [180]. 
108 Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v Russia, above n 104, at [191]. 
109
 Kerimova v Russia, above n 107, at [263]; Khashiyev and Akayeva v Russia, above n 103, at [153]; Isayeva, 
Yusupova and Bazayeva v Russia, above n 104, at [209]; Isayeva v Russia, above n 40, at [213]. 
16 
 
maintenance of the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance 
of unlawful acts.”
110
 
Applying these principles the ECtHR has consistently and trenchantly criticised the processes 
of investigation open to victims of the Chechen conflict and frequently found violations of the 
procedural duty’s various standards.
111
 The ECtHR has criticised frequent and extensive 
delays in commencing investigation, ranging from five days to three to eight months to eight 
years.
112
 The ECtHR has found consistent failures by investigating authorities to identify the 
military units involved in, let alone responsible for, killings, as well as to obtain the military 
plans for operations conducted in particular areas.
113
 Investigating authorities frequently failed 
to identify or question other victims and witnesses,
114
 order autopsies or medical examinations 
where appropriate,
115
 or make contact with, grant victim status to or notify complainants of 
investigative developments.
116
 Frequently, investigations were closed and re-opened, or 
transferred between different state prosecutors without the applicants’ knowledge, 
undermining the ability of victims and family to appeal the decisions to close or re-open 
investigations.
117
 Investigations commonly failed to address matters essential to the question 
of whether particular killings were justified or lawful, including in one case the Russian 
military’s promise of safe passage to civilians prior to attack,
118
 and in another the credible 
allegation that civilians were deliberately targeted for attack by soldiers.
119
 Finally, because 
Russian courts are reliant on the findings of criminal investigations to determine claims and 
identify responsible parties in civil claims,
120
 the ECtHR also found violations of art 13 with 
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routine frequency on the basis that any remedy available in the civil courts was precluded by 
the defective criminal investigations.
121
  
Overall, the ECtHR has been severely critical of the absence of adequate investigation into 
credible claims of ill-treatment, kidnappings, disappearances and extra-judicial executions,
122
 
even noting that the “phenomenon of ‘disappearances’ is well known in Chechnya”.
123
 
Though the ECtHR’s findings must be considered with regard to the systemic unwillingness 
of Russian authorities to investigation human rights abuses,
124
 the ECtHR’s tenacity 
demonstrates “a particularly thorough scrutiny even if domestic investigations and 
proceedings have already taken place.”
125
 Furthermore, in the cases the ECtHR has 
maintained a particular stress on the importance of effective criminal proceedings as a means 
to fulfilling the purposes of the procedural duty and countering impunity,
126
 confirming, for 
one commentator at least, that “criminal proceedings would appear to constitute par 
excellence the most appropriate remedy for satisfying the procedural requirements”.127 
The above jurisprudence from Northern Ireland, Turkey and Chechnya demonstrates that the 
duty of effective investigation is a mechanism by which strong judicial scrutiny may be 
applied to the manner a state investigates and ensures accountability for rights violations.  
D Al-Skeini v United Kingdom 
Al-Skeini v United Kingdom forms a perhaps obvious but fitting coda to the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence on the application of the duty of effective investigation during conflict. Al-
Skeini is particularly significant because the ECtHR applied the above jurisprudence, 
developed in cases of internal conflict, to the extra-territorial circumstances of Iraq.   
In Al-Skeini, and following its holding on the issue of extra-territoriality, the ECtHR found 
that the United Kingdom had violated its art 2 duty to effectively investigate each death in the 
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six test cases chosen, excepting Baha Mousa, whose death was now the subject of the Baha 
Mousa Inquiry.128 The ECtHR held that, notwithstanding the difficult security conditions 
presented by occupied Iraq “during a period when crime and violence were endemic” the 
procedural duty demanded all reasonable steps to undertake an investigation capable of 
identifying those responsible for killings and the legality of their use of force.
129
 The 
procedural duty’s essential purpose and requirement of adequate scope to consider broader 
issues of planning and operational control continued to apply.
130
  
In applying these principles, the ECtHR held that British military’s investigations into the 
cases of fatal shooting by British soldiers on patrol lacked institutional and operation 
independence from the military chain of command and failed to investigate whether the 
military had taken steps to safeguard civilians in the patrolled areas.
131
 In one case the 
investigation had failed to question the soldier responsible for the killing and then closed 
before completion.
132
 In the fifth applicant’s case, whose 15-year old son was allegedly 
drowned by British soldiers, the delay between the investigation and court-martial rendered 
the investigation ineffective, and the narrow focus of the criminal proceedings failed to 
consider, as required by art 2, “broader issues of State responsibility for the death, including 
the instructions, training and supervision given to soldiers.”
133
 In conclusion the ECtHR 
awarded declaratory relief and compensation but, following its general principle that states 
remain free to determine their method of compliance with ECtHR judgments, declined to 
order the United Kingdom to initiate fresh investigations into each death.
134
 
Strasbourg’s jurisprudence thus demonstrates that, notwithstanding the exigencies of armed 
conflict, thorough and effective investigations are required by arts 2 and 3 into allegations of 
killings and ill-treatment and, where applicable, wider matters of military operational 
planning, execution and control.
135
 This conclusion is drawn from the ECtHR’s application in 
Al-Skeini of the principles of effective investigation developed in cases from Russia, Turkey 
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and Northern,
136
 jurisprudence which itself demonstrates that the standards of investigation 
are not diluted for the exigencies of conflict.
137
  
In these circumstances the primary purpose of investigation remains the identification and, 
where possible, punishment of responsible parties and the provision of adequate procedural 
mechanisms to hear individual’s claims.
138
 This evinces a primary focus on justice as 
individual accountability informed by rationales of prevention and deterrence. As an element 
of the state’s art 1 obligation to respect and ensure,
139
 the procedural duty serves “an essential 
public function” to “deter future violations and uphold the rule of law”,
140
 (hopefully) 
restraining state authorities’ abuse of power by the knowledge that their conduct will be 
subject to “rigorous investigations and prosecutions in the criminal courts.”
141
  
I would argue that, based on the standards and purposes of investigation maintained in this 
jurisprudence,  the investigative duty’s extra-territorial application is a positive development 
in terms of ensuring individual accountability for rights violations committed by British 
soldiers in Iraq and, potentially, preventing future abuses. At the same time, the mechanism 
lacks a victim-focused orientation present in comparative institutional responses to rights 
violations. To illustrate this argument, and before undertaking this comparison, it is first 
necessary to provide the investigative duty’s conceptual basis. 
E Conceptualising the Right to Effective an Investigation 
The afore-mentioned public function segues nicely into the procedural duty’s first conceptual 
justification – as an emanation of the State’s substantive duty to protect. This imports the 
notion of procedural protection, under which the legal processes of investigation and 
prosecution must effectively secure the rights in arts 2 and 3.
142
 The breadth of this concept 
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can be seen in the Northern Ireland cases above, where the ECtHR found a violation of art 2 
when early defects – collusion and secrecy – corrupted the entire process of investigation.
143
 
In this protective guise, the procedural duty serves a public interest by securing the 
enforcement of laws protecting the afore-mentioned rights.
144
  
Conversely, by its second conceptual justification the procedural duty protects individual 
interest and in this regard is distinctly remedial. This is illustrated in two respects. The first is 
in cases where the investigative duty arises though the substantive right has not been 
breached,
145
 for instance in cases like Kaya v Turkey where insufficient evidence prevents 
determination of a killing’s legality.
146
 In these cases the procedural duty retrospectively 
secures the victim’s substantive right, reflecting the notion that, in circumstances where 
prosecution is not possible, the duty to investigate “functions as a surrogate for the duty not 
to take life unlawfully.”
147
 
Second, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the procedural duty’s remedial function is by way of art 
13 – the ECHR’s remedial provision. In cases of arguable violation of arts 2 and/or 3, art 13 
requires:
148
 
… in addition to the payment of compensation where appropriate, a 
thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification 
and punishment of those responsible and including effective access for the 
complainant to the investigatory procedure. 
This wording reflects the procedural obligation’s essential purpose under arts 2 and 3.
149
 
While the ECtHR has commonly stated the investigative duty in art 13 is “broader”, it had 
provided little clarification otherwise.
150
 Additionally, the ECtHR often foregoes separate 
analysis of art 13 and finds concurrent violations of the duty to investigate in arts 2 and/or 3 
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and art 13.
151
 As one commentator has noted, the absence of distinction rests on the general 
principle that violations of ECHR rights require access to an effective remedy.
152
  
However, this conceals the limited nature of the duty’s remedial character, which itself stems 
from the ECtHR’s overall limited remedial approach, characterised by one commentator as 
“cost-centred”.
153
 At base, the right to an effective remedy is treated as procedural, rather 
than substantive, such that the ECtHR focuses on “the right to access a remedy rather than 
taking a position on what constitutes an effective remedy.”
154
 This approach distinguishes the 
right to an effective remedy from the right to reparation, and entails the:
155
 
… procedural right of any person claiming that his or her human rights have 
been violated to access to national and any available international procedures 
that might provide redress against past violations and protection against 
future violations. 
This approach is reflected in the ECtHR’s awards of reparation under art 41 of the ECHR, 
which operations in conjunction with art 13,
156
 and allows the ECtHR to award “just 
satisfaction” to applicants whose rights have been violated. Under art 41 the ECtHR prefers 
declaratory relief and monetary compensation,
157
 often holding that a finding of violation is 
itself sufficient just satisfaction.
158
 Most pertinently for our purposes, the operation of arts 13 
and 41 under the ECtHR’s limited remedial approach produces the ECtHR’s consistent and 
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explicit refusal to order states to conduct effective investigations,
159
 despite its status as a 
legal obligation owed under the ECHR.
160
 
Though criticised by commentators,
161
 there are of course persuasive reasons for the 
ECtHR’s “cost-centred” remedial approach. Foremost is the ECtHR’s desire to protect its 
institutional integrity by not imposing extra remedial costs on States parties.
162
 More 
contentiously, the ECtHR has also declined to order redress out of policy considerations, in 
McCann the ECtHR declined to grant compensation as inappropriate, despite finding a 
violation of art 2, because “the three terrorist suspects who were killed had been intending to 
plant a bomb in Gibralter”.
163
  
We therefore have two distinct facets to the procedural duty, one of ensuring individual 
accountability, in the public interest, for violations of arts 2 and 3, the other protecting 
individual’s art 2 and 3 rights and ensuring the availability of a mechanism to individuals to 
hear their claim of rights violation. At a glance these objectives are complementary, and one 
cannot deny that identifying and punishing individuals responsible for art 2 and 3 violations 
provides a measure of relief to victims.
164
  
Nevertheless, I argue that the ECtHR’s failure to reflect on the procedural duty’s form, and 
specifically its remedial form, when applied extra-territorially is problematic for two reasons. 
First, the ECtHR’s approach is itself in tension with the general thrust of contemporary 
international mechanisms designed to address gross human rights violations in conflict. 
Second, by the principles of subsidiarity and flexibility the procedural duty allows much 
scope for domestic judicial manipulation as to the purposes of investigation and the 
subsequent mechanisms considered sufficient as a result. These propositions are illustrated in 
the rest of the paper. 
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IV Comparative Institutional Responses to Rights Violations in Conflict 
Comparative international mechanisms have developed a diverse set of objectives in their 
approach to human rights violations. With the objectives and rationales of the procedural duty 
in mind, the theme of the following discussion is simple – to determine the effects and nature 
of these institutional reactions to human rights violations during conflict and compare them to 
the approach of the ECHR’s system, and evaluate the tension, if any. 
A Victims, remedy and truth 
The conventional focus of international human rights law has been “standard-setting and the 
establishment of institutions tasked with promoting human rights and monitoring states’ 
compliance with their obligations.”
165
 This paralleled a focus on perpetrators and the best 
means of ensuring their prosecution and punishment.
166
 In this the procedural duty’s focus on 
ensuring processes for accountability and identification of perpetrators, and emphasis on 
criminal accountability for violations of fundamental rights,
167
 operating in conjunction with 
the procedural protection concept, shares links with comparative international 
jurisprudence.
168
  
However, these comparative institutional mechanisms have in recent years broadened their 
objectives to account for the needs of victims and considerations of adequate reparation.
169
 
Under these victim-oriented principles, notions of accountability and justice are no longer 
conceptualised in purely legal terms, but encompass:
170
 
… a wide range of measures – truth-telling, judicial reform, prosecutions, 
exhumations and reburials, memorialisation, reparations (including 
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rehabilitation, restitution and compensation), lustration to police and security 
forces, and other guarantees of non-reparation. 
At the United Nations level, this paradigm shift is most evident in the General Assembly’s 
2005 adoption of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Basic Principles).171 Preceded 20 years earlier 
by a draft instrument,
172
 the Basic Principles are drafted from a “victim-based perspective” 
with the intention of providing procedures to implement existing international humanitarian 
and human rights law obligations and coherent methods for addressing victim’s rights.
173
 
Though not binding, the Basic Principles influence is evident in treaty-making,174 
jurisprudence and developing concepts of reparation.
175
 This shift toward victim-focused 
paradigms is easily dealt with under the concepts of remedy, reparation and truth. 
The paradigm-shift in the concepts of remedy and reparation are most easily dealt with first. 
The concept that breach of a right demands a remedy is an inherent feature of legal systems 
worldwide,
176
 and numerous international instruments affirm the right to an effective 
remedy.
177
 As noted above in regards to the ECtHR’s remedial approach, on conventional 
analysis the right to an effective remedy is primarily procedural.
178
 In this form the right 
ensures victims have access to appropriate bodies that may fairly hear and decide their claim 
of rights violation.
179
 A conceptual distinction is thus made between the procedural right to a 
remedy and substantive right to reparation,
180
 and the latter refers to the redress that is 
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awarded following a successful result in the procedural forum.
181
 Furthermore, so long as the 
former is provided, States have broad discretion to determine appropriate substantive 
reparation.
182
 
However, this conceptual distinction has weakened in recent years. The Basic Principles treat 
the victim’s right to reparation as one aspect of the right to a remedy.
183
 Various courts and 
treaty bodies also adopt this interpretation. The International Court of Justice has affirmed the 
right to reparation for human rights violations that “must, as far as possible, wipe out all the 
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, 
have existed if that act had not been committed.”
184
 This approach, the international law 
principle of restitution in integrum,185 is said to be consistent with the remedial model adopted 
in the Basic Principles.186 The United Nations Human Rights Committee has adopted the 
expanded concept of the right to a remedy.
187
 The Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (the Chamber) – charged with applying the ECHR –used this power to order 
adequate reparation “commensurate with the seriousness of these violations and to the 
suffering of the victims.”
188
 In direct contrast to the ECtHR’s refusal to order investigations, 
and on the basis of art 13 of the ECHR, the Chamber has consistently ordered States to not 
merely conduct criminal investigations but to “bring the perpetrators to justice and to provide 
effective access for the applicants to the investigatory procedure.”
189
  
The Chamber’s jurisprudence leads nicely into consideration of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Right’s (IACtHR) reparations jurisprudence. Applying as it does the dual concept of 
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remedy, its approach is often contrasted with the ECtHR’s remedial approach.
190
 The IACtHR 
laid out its remedial perspective in its first judgment, stating that:
191
 
The object of international human rights law is not to punish those 
individuals who are guilty of violations, but rather to protect the victims and 
to provide for the reparation of damages resulting from the acts of the State 
responsible. 
The IACtHR orders reparation under several principles:  restitution, compensation, 
rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. Not coincidentally, the Basic 
Principles considers these principles as necessary for full and effective reparation.192 
As to restitution and cessation, the IACtHR commonly orders States to locate victim’s 
remains and return them to next of kin, an act incorporating the principle of rehabilitation.
193
 
As well the IACtHR has ordered the release of prisoners convicted by unfair trials,
194
 the 
quashing of unfair convictions made under laws inconsistent with the IACHT,
195
 and the 
expungement of criminal records.
196
 Regarding satisfaction, the IACtHR has ordered States to 
publish excerpts of its judgments,
197
 publicly recognise their international responsibility by 
official public ceremony,
198
 and the implementation of national exhumations programs.
199
 As 
to guarantees of non-repetition, the IACtHR has ordered legislative and regulatory reform that 
adequately defines the crime of forced disappearance,
200
 protects indigenous property 
rights,
201
 and allows states to comply with their obligations to investigate violations and 
identify and punish responsible parties.
202
 As to rehabilitation, States have been ordered to 
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establish developmental funds for health, housing and educational programmes,
203
 required 
the reopening and staffing of village schools and medical clinics,
204
 and provide medical and 
psychological treatment by specialised clinics  that seeks to reduce victim’s mental and 
physical suffering.
205
 
In direct contrast to the ECtHR, the IACtHR’s most common order of substantive reparation 
against States is a sophisticated obligation to investigate human rights abuses and identify, 
prosecute and punish the perpetrators.
206
 Factually, investigations have been ordered in cases 
concerning the 1986 massacre of an indigenous village by security forces,
207
 state-sanctioned 
murder and subsequent cover-ups,
208
 and multiple cases of forced disappearance.
209
 In 
addition to the investigation and punishment of responsible parties, the IACtHR has ordered 
the removal of obstacles perpetuating impunity, the sanctioning of public officials who 
obstructed the criminal investigation, adequate safety guarantees to victims, witnesses and 
officials involved in the investigation, and finally the use of all technical means possible to 
recover victim’s remains.
210
 Additionally, the IACtHR has required States to ensure criminal 
proceedings already underway are conducted effectively and that victims and next of kin have 
full access and capacity to participate in all stages of an investigation and criminal 
proceedings.
211
  
The IACtHR builds the duty to investigate from the needs to counter impunity and deter and 
prevent future abuses.
212
 In this, as with the ECtHR, the duty to investigate stems from States 
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obligations to ensure and protect IACHR rights.
213
 In addition, the IACtHR bases the duty of 
investigation on a victim’s and family’s right to know what happened to victims, and which 
state agents were responsible for specific acts.
214
 This is predicated on the right to the truth, 
which the IACtHR considers an important measure of reparation owed to victims, next of kin, 
and society.
215
 Therefore, while the starting point is the same, the IACtHR’s substantive 
investigative duty offers a sharp contrast to the ECtHR’s position. 
The IACtHR’s use of the right to the truth as a conceptual building block for its duty of 
investigation introduces discussion of this right and the victim-oriented conceptual rationale 
it provides. A legal concept that has emerged at domestic, regional and international law, the 
right to the truth is defined as an obligation upon the state to “provide information to victims 
or to their families or even society as a whole about the circumstances surrounding serious 
violations of human rights.”
216
 Originating in the law of armed conflict and initially 
expressed primarily in relation to the phenomenon of disappeared persons,
217
 the right is 
recognised in the Basic Principles as a mode of reparation for human rights violations,218 and 
various United Nations bodies have stressed its importance as a non-derogable right.
219
  
Truth and reconciliation commissions, the institutional response to human rights violations 
perhaps most closely associated with the right to the truth, provide insight into the right’s 
conceptual rationale. Developed specifically to respond to episodes of political violence and 
rights violations, truth commissions are generally defined as:
220
 
A truth commission (1) is focused on past, rather than ongoing, events; (2) 
investigations a pattern of events that took place over a period of time; (3) 
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engages directly and broadly with the affected population, gathering 
information on their experiences; (4) is a temporary body, with the aim of 
concluding with a final report; and (5) is officially authorised or empowered 
by the state under review. 
As their moniker suggests, truth commissions are established to “tell the truth” and, more 
elaborately, to “make a full account of what has happened and to draw a record for history of 
unprecedented educational value for generations to come.”
221
 They are given a broad scope of 
inquiry and systemic violations of human rights over a number of years.
222
 As above, truth 
commissions’ truth-telling aim operates in conjunction with their victim-centred approach,
 223
 
itself reflective of the influence of restorative justice principles.
224
 
The victim-centred truth-telling focus is said to confer multiple benefits. In the literature, truth 
commissions are often situated dichotomously with and said to benefit victims in a manner 
criminal trials cannot. These benefits range from the generic – truth commissions possess the 
“markedly superior characteristic, rarely apparent in criminal trials, of systematic 
consideration of the victims”,
225
 to the cathartic – “healing forums that focus specifically on 
the voices of victim-survivors.”
226
 More tangibly, the knowledge engendered by fulfilling the 
right to the truth is said to prevent future violations,
227
 and truth commissions are designed to 
counter impunity, contribute toward reconciliation, and provide closure and aid the healing of 
victims.
228
 These developments in the concepts of remedy, reparation and the right to the 
truth, underlain by a general focus on victims’ needs, are also evident in international criminal 
law. 
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B International Criminal Law 
In recent years International criminal law’s (ICL) institutional design has been heavily 
influenced by victim-centred and restorative justice paradigms. This conceptual 
diversification is evident in a 2004 Report of the Secretary-General, which comments on the 
objectives of ICL:
229
 
… bringing to justice those responsible for serious violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law, putting an end to such violations and 
preventing their recurrence, securing justice and dignity for victims, 
establishing a record of past events, promoting national reconciliation, re-
establishing the rule of law and contributing to the restoration of peace. 
Of course, ICL’s conceptual heritage is predicated on effectively punishing individual 
perpetrators.
230
 This justice narrative, premised on philosophical currents of western 
liberalism and legalism, is still ICL’s predominant mode of determining responsibility and 
dealing in punishment.
231
 It was the prime objective of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
232
 and is evident in ICL’s adoption from domestic criminal 
law the processes – charge, trial appeal and punishment – and principles of individual 
culpability.
233
 Finally, at the conceptual core of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
remains ensuring the prosecution of perpetrators of serious international crimes.
234
  
Nevertheless, wider objectives exist and have been recently adopted in ICL. The function of 
“establishing a record of past events” noted in the Secretary-General’s report,
235
 said to aid 
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societies emerging from conflict “by establishing detailed and well-established records of 
particular incident”,
236
 has been a contentious aspect of ICL since Tokyo and Nuremburg.
237
  
Different international criminal tribunals have embraced this function,
238
 and their judgments 
have been said to “challenge the long-held assumption in socio-legal scholarship that courts 
are inappropriate venues to construct wide-ranging historical explanations of past 
conflicts.”
239
 Conceptualised as both a means and an end, ICL’s function as an “arbiter of 
historical truth” is said to contribute to both the determination of guilt and,
240
 due to the nature 
of atrocities in which ICL trades, where “uncertainty is the horrible norm”, fulfils the 
“pressing moral obligation to obtain the truth about them, as best as the truth can be 
determined.”
241
 Here is introduced ICL’s relationship with the right to the truth, said to 
“intermesh strategically with the broader objectives of international criminal law,” including 
the restoration of peace, facilitating reconciliation, the countering of impunity and 
establishing a historical record.
242
 
These wider objectives lead into consideration of the Rome Statute of the ICC (the Rome 
Statute), said to be a “testament to the successes of the restorative justice and victims’ rights 
movements”,
243
 and characterised by its “victim-friendliness”.
244
 The ICC Appeals Chamber 
has stated that the protection of victim’s interests “is a recurring theme of the Statute”,
245
 and 
one commentator has stated the ICC stands for deterrence, criminal accountability, and also 
“social welfare and restorative justice.”
246
 Prior to this ICL processes made little room for 
victims.
247
 Primarily, the Rome Statute provides for victim’s interest in two respects: 
participation as witnesses and with independent standing, and redress and reparation.
248
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The ICC’s victim participation regime has been lauded as moving toward a restorative justice-
oriented paradigm and away from a retributive justice one.
249
 The ICC prosecutor is required 
to consider victim’s interests during their investigation and when deciding to initiate 
prosecution.
250
 Under the Rome Statute victims are entitled to “present their views and 
concerns” to the ICC “where their personal interests are affected”,
251
 and the ICC is required 
to “take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, 
dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses”.
252
 Finally, all victims are entitled to legal 
representation which, for reasons of practicality, is provided by common legal 
representatives.
253
   
As to redress for victims, the Rome Statute has been referred to as a “watershed developed” in 
relation to the advancement of victim-oriented remedial paradigms, akin to the approaches of 
the IACtHR and United Nations human rights institutions.
254
 The ICC is required to “establish 
principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, 
compensation and rehabilitation.”
255
 However, the interpretation of this provision was left to 
the ICC.
256
 A reparatory mechanism has been established: the Trust Fund for Victims.
257
 It 
may act in the process of allocating reparations to victims after a conviction or use its 
resources to benefit victims in instances where prosecution does not occur.
258
 The Trust Fund 
has begun implementing the latter by providing assistance to victims in the form of physical 
rehabilitation, and material and/or psychological rehabilitation.
259
 
It may be said that these provisions sit within their specific institutional context. I argue that 
more significant is the entrenchment of victim-focused principles and restorative justice 
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concepts. Under the Rome Statute, as well as other international criminal tribunals,
260
 victim 
participation in proceedings is not a privilege, but a right.
261
 In addition, the right of 
participation is itself tied conceptually, both in the literature and jurisprudence, to the 
realisation of other rights – primarily the right to truth and the right to justice.
262
 Victim 
participation is said to contribute to the determination of an accused’s innocence or guilt,
263
 
enable a victim’s rights to reparation for the violation suffered,
264
 and, at its broadest, to fulfil 
the objective of satisfying victims’ interest in the proper administration of justice.
265
 These 
conceptual rationales also bring us full circle in regards to the entrenchment of victim-focused 
norms within international law. The provisions for victim participation and redress in the 
Rome Statute were partially inspired by the 1985 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice 
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power,266 the predecessor to the 2005 Basic Principles, 
parts of which were directly copied into the Rome Statute.
267
 In 2009 the ICC additionally 
drew on both the 1985 and 2005 Declarations in adopting its guiding Strategy regarding 
victims.
268
 
Of course, these objectives are not without criticism. Many commentators criticise victim 
participation for the potentially detrimental effect it may have on the defendant’s fair trial 
rights.
269
 Similarly, the historical record function of ICL has been criticised as incompatible 
with legal modes of reasoning and the accused’s rights.
270
 Indeed, the Secretary-General has 
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acknowledged that, given this diversity of objectives, “achieving and balancing the various 
objectives of [international] criminal justice is less straightforward.”
271
 
As well, it would be unwise to draw conclusions from these comparisons without first briefly 
commenting on the highly contextual nature of these institutions. Truth commissions and 
international criminal tribunals are self-consciously mechanisms of transitional justice, which 
itself constitutes:
272
 
…the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s 
attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order 
to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.  
Therefore, in comparing these mechanisms and the procedural duty, regard needs to be had to 
the fact these mechanisms are tailored according to context and work in conjunction to benefit 
a society holistically by seeking to fulfil the objectives of “promoting national reconciliation, 
re-establishing the rule of law and contributing to the restoration of peace.”
273
 
Nevertheless, transitional justice embraces the principles of restorative justice, such that it 
focuses on repairing past harm and bringing reconciliation to those most affected by that 
harm.
274
 I would argue that underlying the conceptual shift in these institutional responses to 
human rights abuses is the principle that justice for victims of armed conflict requires three 
different elements: truth, reparations and judicial accountability.
275
 This general principle is 
equally applicable to the procedural duty. 
C Concluding Remarks on Comparative Institutional Mechanisms 
The above discussion demonstrates that, in terms of the objective of ensuring individual 
accountability for rights abuses, the objectives of the procedural duty and comparative 
mechanisms sit in harmony. Comparative institutions of international human rights and ICL 
aim for prosecution. Despite the fact that the ECHR’s procedural duty is one of means not 
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result,
276
 and as such does not mandate a particular outcome,
277
 the procedural duty, as 
reinforced by the ECHR’s expectations of the criminal process as capable of leading to the 
punishment of identified perpetrators,
278
 presents a means of ensuring the strength of the 
criminal process in punishing violations of arts 2 and/or 3.
279
  
In relation to the Iraq claims, it is also not inappropriate to mention that this provides some 
means of plugging an accountability gap between ICL and international human rights law.
280
 
The United Kingdom has an international legal obligation to prosecute certain conduct in 
Iraq. The Geneva Conventions, the Convention against Torture, and the Rome Statute of the 
ICC require the United Kingdom to prosecute the ill-treatment and unlawful killing of 
civilians.
281
 This is reflected in domestic legislation.
282
 Under the principle of 
complementarity the ICC has jurisdiction to initiate prosecution where a state with relevant 
jurisdiction is unwilling or unable to carry out a prosecution.
283
 However, the ICC is unlikely 
to intervene in this regard, as illustrated by a United States diplomatic cable, which stated:
 284 
Ocampo [the first ICC Prosecutor] has said that he looking at the actions of 
British forces in Iraq – which … led a British ICTY prosecutor to nearly fall 
off his chair … Privately, Ocampo has said that he wishes to dispose of the 
Iraq issues (i.e. not investigate them). 
As well, one of the few Court Martials of British soldiers for the death of an Iraqi civilian, Mr 
Baha Mousa, was undermined by “a more or less obvious closing of ranks.”
285
 If the 
procedural duty is able to produce investigations that contribute to remedying the 
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accountability gap produced by these political and practical obstacles to prosecution,
286
 it is 
beneficial in itself and achieves a measure of consistency with other international approaches.  
Nevertheless, the procedural duty sits in disharmony with these comparative institutional 
responses and their adoption of objectives broader than conventional individual 
accountability. At their broadest, the objectives of truth-telling, appropriate reparation based 
on principles of rehabilitation, restitution and satisfaction, as conceptually informed by 
victim-oriented and restorative justice principles, are designed to “give victims of gross 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law a voice and to promote 
reconciliation.”
287
 On this front, the procedural duty, as informed by the ECtHR’s broader 
jurisprudential and remedial approach, is deficient.  
This is not to say there are not glimpses of the conceptual building blocks for such an 
approach in Strasbourg’s jurisprudence. The ECtHR already requires, in certain 
circumstances, family participation at inquests and adequate legal representation to enable 
such participation under the procedural duty’s requirement of public scrutiny.
288
 As well, the 
Grand Chamber has acknowledged United Nations Human Rights Council Resolutions and 
submissions of third-party interveners concerning the right to the truth,
289
 and the right can be 
derived from the effective protection duty to guarantee and protect human rights, a 
fundamental conceptual pillar of the procedural duty.
290
  
However, majority approaches in the ECtHR lack the conceptual basis that a concerted 
adoption of victims’ rights paradigms possesses. For instance, under the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudential approach the right to the truth is subsidiary to the objectives of accountability 
and effective protection, and “’legal truth’ is merely a by-product of a dispute settlement 
mechanism.”
291
 As well, the Grand Chamber in the above-mentioned case did not explicitly 
the applicant’s right to the truth as a remedial concept, as noted by the Judges in the minority 
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on this conceptual point and who advocated that the ECtHR acknowledge a free-standing 
right to the truth under art 13.
292
  
Therefore, while the procedural duty may meet victims’ demand for justice,
293
 the nature of 
the allegations raised in conflict, for instance the Iraq claims involve “murder, manslaughter, 
the wilful infliction of serious bodily injury, sexual indignities, cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment and large scale violation of international humanitarian law”,
294
 calls for an 
approach more akin to those of the comparative mechanisms analysed. Without account of 
victims, where processes of investigation and possible prosecution take place overseas, any 
sense of justice gained by the victims and family risks being lessened by the process’s 
“hierarchical, temporal and physical remoteness.”
295
 Conversely, victim support and 
reparations may “provide a more tangible and concrete form of justice and one that can 
readily be made manifest in the localities where victims live.”
296
 
This brings us to the Mousa litigation itself – the first challenges in the High Court and Court 
of Appeal to the IHAT investigations, and then the most recent successful challenge in the 
High Court. This litigation elucidates the second tension created by the procedural duty’s 
extra-territorial application by the domestic courts. As will be demonstrated, at the point of 
contact between the supra-national and domestic courts, for various reasons, the possibility of 
incorporating wider and victim-friendly objectives is lost. 
V The Mousa Litigation 
A Mousa (No 1) 
In Mousa (No 1) the claimant, Ali Zaki Mousa, representing over 140 Iraqi citizens detained 
by British forces at different points during their 2003–2008 occupation of Basra in Southern 
Iraq, applied for judicial review of the government’s refusal to order a public inquiry to 
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investigate the claimants’ allegations that during their detention they were ill-treated by 
British soldiers in violation of art 3.
297
  
In both the High Court and Court of Appeal, Mr Mousa submitted that the mechanism used to 
investigate the claims, IHAT, was insufficiently independent for its inclusion of members of 
the Royal Military Police, and the procedural duty could in any case only be satisfied by 
conducting a full public inquiry.
298
 Specifically, the inquiry sought was stated to be:
299
 
… a comprehensive and single public inquiry that will cover the UK’s 
detention policy in South East Iraq, examining in particular the systemic use 
of coercive interrogation techniques which resulted in the Claimants’ ill-
treatment and which makes it possible to learn lessons for the future action 
of the British military. 
In response, the Secretary of State submitted that the procedural duty was satisfied by 
IHAT’s process of investigation and the already established Baha Mousa and Al-Sweady 
Inquiries, both looking into certain specific instances of the alleged of ill-treatment of 
detainees in Iraq.
300
 
1 Judgments of the High Court and Court of Appeal 
Richards LJ for the High Court rejected Mr Mousa’s submission that IHAT lacked sufficient 
independence by its use of Royal Military Police members to investigate the claimants’ 
allegations.
301
 He further held that art 3 did not automatically require a public inquiry and the 
Secretary of State’s “wait and see” approach as to whether a public inquiry was necessary 
following further investigation by IHAT, was adequate.
302
 Richards LJ reasoned that IHAT’s 
investigations would consider systemic issues,
303
 that the Baha Mousa and Al-Sweady 
Inquiries were considering certain systemic issues and that the “very heavy resource 
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implications” of a full inquiry merited “real weight”.
304
 The High Court concluded that a 
public inquiry was not yet required.
305
 
Maurice Kay LJ allowed the applicant’s appeal in the Court of Appeal. As in the High Court, 
the primary issue before the Court of Appeal was the independence of IHAT, as required 
under art 3’s procedural duty.
306
 With perhaps a hint of foreshadowing, Maurice Kay LJ first 
stated that “[i]t seems that part of the choreography of public accountability in this country is 
the clamour for a public inquiry into suspected wrongdoing by agents of the state.”
307
 After 
discussion of IHAT’s structural intricacies, Maurice Kay LJ turned to the central issue. 
Noting the functional importance of the perception of independence in order to ensure public 
confidence, he stated “public perception of the possibility of unconscious bias is the key.”
308
 
Maurice Kay LJ concluded that IHAT’s independence was compromised by its use of 
Military Police members to investigate allegations which, if true, occurred when members of 
the same branch were involved in interrogating detainees in Iraq.
309
 
Maurice Kay LJ then rejected the Secretary of State’s “wait and see” policy regarding a 
public inquiry’s necessity. Maurice Kay LJ held that the Baha Mousa Inquiry was not 
capable of considering issues arising from the whole 2003–2008 period of British occupation. 
With great significance for our later consideration of Mousa No 2, Maurice Kay LJ finished 
this point by stating:
310
 
… it was entirely foreseeable that [the Mousa Inquiry] would not and could 
not satisfy the Article 3 investigative obligation in relation to later 
allegations spreading over several years in various locations involving 
different units. 
Nevertheless, Maurice Kay LJ did not order a full public inquiry, instead leaving it to the 
Secretary of State to reconsider how to satisfy art 3’s procedural duty.
311
 The Court of Appeal 
made further significant remarks. Regarding the purposes of investigation, Maurice Kay LJ 
referred to the purposes of fact-finding, public scrutiny of culpable conduct, the rectification 
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of dangerous practices and ensuring family members of deceased victims the lessons learned 
from a death may saves the lives of others.
312
 In cases of ill-treatment, stated Maurice Kay LJ, 
the satisfaction of knowing that lessons learned may benefit future persons “would accrue to 
the proven victim in person.”
313
 Arguably, this demonstrates how the investigative duty’s 
procedural remedial nature precludes consideration of victim-oriented questions of adequate 
reparation, and principally questions of rehabilitation. 
B The High Court’s Decision in Mousa (No 2) 
Following the Court of Appeal’s decision, IHAT’s Royal Military Police members were 
replaced by Royal Navy Police and civilian personnel, largely ex-civilian Police 
investigators. The Government would keep under consideration the necessity of a public 
inquiry and review the Baha Mousa Inquiry’s findings to determine the viability of 
prosecuting those involved in Baha Mousa’s death. In addition, following as it did the 
ECtHR’s judgment in Al-Skeini, IHAT was tasked with investigating those deaths engaging 
art 2.
314
 
In May 2012 the original claimants in Mousa (No 1), as represented by Mr Mousa, 
commenced judicial review proceedings challenging the reformed IHAT. Mr Mousa 
submitted that IHAT still lacked independence and that a public inquiry would inevitably be 
required to satisfy the United Kingdom’s duty to investigate the alleged breaches of arts 2 
and 3.
315
 The High Court rejected the first claim, that IHAT lacked independence, but 
accepted the second and third, that IHAT could not satisfy the investigative duties under arts 
2 and 3. However, the High Court declined to order an inquiry, for reasons to be discussed 
below. 
1 IHAT’s Independence 
Concerning the first issue, Mr Mousa submitted that IHAT lacked sufficient independence on 
the basis that investigation of the claimants’ allegations by any police branch of the British 
military constituted self-investigation. Specifically, Mr Mousa pointed to the operational 
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deployment in Iraq of service police forces, from which IHAT’s members were drawn, and 
their involvement in interrogation training and policy.
316
 
After detailed explanation of IHAT’s institutional structure, the High Court concluded that 
IHAT was independent.
317
 It rejected the argument that, in principle, a service police force 
could not independently investigate military personnel. The question was ultimately whether 
sufficient independence existed in fact.
318
  
The High Court did not refer to the principle that perceptions of unconscious bias are 
impermissible, as the Court of Appeal did in Mousa (No 1).319 Arguably this is for the same 
considerations of practicality that led the High Court to find IHAT was sufficiently 
independent. The High Court stated that a converse answer “would strike at the whole 
structure of the service police and prosecution service.”
320
 This holding looks to future cases 
of investigation in conflict zones and the High Court’s arguable unwillingness to require of 
the military a completely separate investigation service to conduct investigations under the 
ECHR. 
2 IHAT’s Investigative Efficacy 
Regarding IHAT’s actual investigations, Mr Mousa submitted that, despite the question of 
independence, a single public inquiry was required to satisfy the investigative duty. This 
order was sought predominantly in relation to the deaths of Iraqi citizens that occurred in 
British custody or under the control of British forces.
321
  
In setting out the law the High Court first noted the common law’s particular concern for 
deaths that occur in state custody.
322
 Investigation into such deaths is performed by coroner’s 
inquests,
323
 discussed further below. Referring to the art 2 investigative duty, the High Court 
emphasised three investigative objectives particularly significant to the claims in Mousa: 
public accessibility, especially relative to victims’ families; the capacity to analyse broader 
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issues of planning and operational control; and, the ‘lessons learned’ function.
324
 The High 
Court summarised these objectives by stating:
325
 
…the article 2 investigative duty of the state in the case of deaths in custody is only 
discharged by a full, fair and fearless investigation accessible to the victim’s 
families and to the public into each death, which must look into and consider the 
immediate and surrounding circumstances in which each of the deaths occurred.  
The surrounding circumstances included the training, instructions and supervision of soldiers 
who participated in interrogations of detainees who died in custody. The investigations had to 
be capable of identify culpable conduct and the steps needed to rectify dangerous procedures 
and practices.
326
 
In its application of these principles to the investigations undertaken by IHAT, the High Court 
stated that in each case of death it was first necessary to determine the viability of 
prosecution. This follows the principle, noted above, that criminal investigation and 
prosecution is the most effective means of fulfilling the procedural duty’s requirement that an 
investigation must be capable of identifying and punishing responsible parties.
327
 It was 
therefore necessary to determine whether prosecution could occur in each case so that IHAT’s 
public, as opposed to criminal, investigation did not prejudice possible prosecution. 
In cases where prosecution was not a realistic possibility, the High Court held that IHAT did 
not satisfy the procedural duty. It lacked the capacity to determine whether sufficient evidence 
existed in each case to initiate prosecution,
328
 and the delay in investigating deaths, in some 
cases almost 10 years, in custody was so significant it amounted to a breach of art 2 in 
itself.
329
 IHAT was also insufficiently accessible to the public and victims’ families.
330
 
Finally, it was not capable of examining issues of systemic abuse or the deficiencies in 
training and supervision which produced it.
331
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The High Court then referred to two mechanisms by which the government could comply 
with the procedural duty: a single public inquiry or multiple individual investigations based 
on the coroner’s inquest model. Opting for the latter, the High Court stated that a full public 
inquiry would be excessive in duration and prohibitively expensive.
332
 In addition, many of 
the Baha Mousa Inquiry’s recommendations had been accepted, decreasing the significance 
of the lessons learned objective of investigation.
333
 While the former point is understandable, 
the latter point is difficult. As noted above by the Court of Appeal, the Baha Mousa Inquiry 
could not fulfil the art 3 procedural duty in relation to a multitude of allegations spread over 
the six-year period of operation.
334
 It is difficult to see how it could in any case fulfil the 
added requirements of the art 2 procedural duty and multiple deaths spread over the six year 
occupation. The significance of this point is the subject of this paper’s last section. 
The High Court then outlined the form of investigation it envisaged IHAT conducting into 
each death to comply with art 2. Referring to these as ‘Inquisitorial inquiries’ based on the 
coroner’s inquest model of investigation, the High Court stated they would involve multiple 
persons investigating different deaths by an inquisitorial approach and conducting their own 
examination of witnesses.
335
 The High Court has recently given judgment on this framework 
in practice, discussed below. 
The Government was to be responsible for supervising the overall pace and efficiency of each 
inquiry and the High Court recommended that a Parliamentary inquiry would scrutinise wider 
systemic issues and make appropriate recommendations. The latter substituted for benefits 
that would be attained by a public inquiry,
336
 arguably an attempt by the High Court to avoid 
trickier (political) issues of wider military planning. 
Before concluding, the High Court considered IHAT’s art 3 investigations. It held that IHAT’ 
investigations into these cases, the task for which it was originally designed, was satisfactory 
subject to the family and public accessibility requirements, and questions of delay.
337
 Despite 
unreasonable delay, the art 2 investigations took priority. Once they were completed, IHAT 
could use the experience gained to determine the possibility of prosecution in individual art 3 
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cases. Where prosecution could not occur, the High Court envisaged that IHAT could 
approach the art 3 cases by investigating a sample of the more serious cases.
338
 
3 The Content of Inquisitorial Investigations 
In early October 2013 the High Court gave judgment setting out the precise form of its model 
of investigation.
339
 A High Court Judge, Leggatt J has been appointed to ensure against delay 
and ensure IHAT’s overall focus in direction.
340
 Individual inquiries, operating as inquests 
would, are to commence as soon as possible in cases requiring art 2 investigations once it is 
clear prosecution is not possible.
341
 Each inquiry has the power to compel military personnel 
to give evidence and produce statements,
342
 must be public and allow next of kin to 
participate by video-link from Iraq and possibly making documents available over the 
internet.
343
  
Fundamentally, the purpose of each inquiry is to provide a description of how, when and 
where the deceased died, but may not identify specific responsible individuals.
344
 As to 
systemic issues, the lessons that may be learnt are a matter to be decided in each case.
345
 
Inspectors have the discretion to determine the scope of disclosure in each inquiry, but it is 
likely to be limited.
346
 Families may not access documents relating to training or supervision 
and will primarily participate by following the Inspector’s cross-examination of witnesses.
347
 
Families and interested parties have no right to ask their own questions.
348
 Some legal 
assistance will be provided to families to enable their presentation of evidence.
349
 Finally, 
regarding the art 3 cases, IHAT was not entitled to suspend these cases while it dealt with the 
art 2 investigations, and Leggatt J must consider whether to appoint an inspector for claims of 
alleged ill-treatment once the art 2 inquiries begin.
350
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Significantly, in regard to victim and next of kin participation, the High Court stated that the 
Inspector in each inquiry must pay the “closest attention to the rehabilitative and cathartic 
issues that arise … and the interests of all the victims.”
351
 Acknowledgement of these aims is 
a significant step, associated as they are with the needs of victims. However, they sit 
incongruously with the limited practical steps taken for family and victim participation. 
VI Elucidating the tension in Extra-territorial Investigations 
By comparing the outcome in Mousa (No 2) with previous domestic investigative duty 
jurisprudence, this section will demonstrate that the model of investigation ordered by the 
High Court falls short of that indicated necessary in the case law. Indeed, the case law 
indicates a single public inquiry is indeed required by the nature and extent of the 
allegations.
352
 The High Court’s refusal demonstrates the tension created by domestic court’s 
applying the procedural duty to extra-territorial human rights violations in conflict, where 
wider victim-focused objectives arise, but are overlooked by a focus on individual 
accountability. 
A The Basics of Inquiries and Inquests 
A brief introduction to the objectives of public inquiries and Coroner’s inquests will guide 
this discussion. Public inquiries investigate and determine the truth on matters of public 
concern.
353
 These matters can range from incompetence and impropriety to accidents and 
disasters.
354
 A short summary of an inquiry’s potential purpose includes to: establish the 
facts; learn from specific events; perform a cathartic function by reconciliation and 
resolution; reassurance by the rebuilding of public confidence; accountability and blame; and 
purely political functions, for instance, to show that “something is being done” concerning a 
particular event.
355
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An inquiry’s paramount focus is systemic failure, not minute detail.
356
 Arguably, such a focus 
would, as felt by the High Court, be unworkable when applied to the number of claims in 
Mousa, creating as it would unreasonable delay and cost.357 Yet, the Mousa claimants, 
throughout both the Al-Skeini and Mousa litigation, consistently pressed for a single public 
inquiry.
358
 Arguably, this was to obtain the more victim-friendly benefits perceived to be 
offered by the full public inquiry mode of investigation. Public inquiries have been compared 
to truth commissions as a victim-focused accountability mechanism,
359
 and most aligned with 
ensuring the right to the truth as set out under the Basic Principles.360 In addition, victims of 
human rights abuse often prioritise exposure of the truth, and acknowledgement of 
responsibility and apology by the state over securing prosecution.
361
 
The focus of the coroner’s inquest is conversely narrower. In the United Kingdom, inquests 
are public hearings carried out by a coroner, an independent judicial officer, ordinarily sitting 
with a jury.
362
 The coroner’s duty, and any inquest’s purpose, is to determine who the 
deceased was and how, when and where they died.
363
 In deaths that engage art 2, the question 
of how a person died must be interpreted as “by what means and in what circumstances.”
364
 
The purposes of the coroner’s inquest are to establish and publicise the facts, expose 
discreditable and culpable conduct, dispel suspicions of wrongful conduct, remedy dangerous 
procedures and practices and ensure that the victim’s family know that lessons may be 
learned to protect others’ lives.
365
 As referred to above in relation to the Court of Appeal’s 
decision in Mousa No 1, these purposes are equally applicable to investigations under art 3.
366
  
As outlined above, the High Court refused to order a full public inquiry, instead basing its 
model of investigation on the Coroner’s inquest model.  
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B The Procedural Duty through the Domestic Courts 
The British courts follow Strasbourg in building the procedural duty from the substantive duty 
to protect, which the House of Lords termed the systemic duty.
367
 The procedural duty is 
treated as an aspect of the broader duty to protect by prevention and punishment.
368
 This 
confers on the procedural duty a broad ambit. Any investigation must lead to a determination 
on whether a use of force was justified,
369
 but in appropriate cases the objectives of 
investigation extend beyond ensuring accountability of state agents to ensuring:
370  
… so far as possible that the full facts are brought to light; that culpable and 
discreditable conduct is exposed and brought to public notice; that suspicion 
of deliberate wrongdoing (if unjustified) is allayed; that dangerous practices 
and procedures are rectified; and that those who have lost their relative may 
at least have the satisfaction of knowing that lessons learned from his death 
may save the lives of others. 
This statement of principle, which forms the basis of any discussion of the procedural duty in 
domestic jurisprudence,
371
 demonstrates that in appropriate cases the objectives of 
investigation extend beyond ensuring accountability of state agents to the determination of 
systemic failures.
372
 Deaths that result from a state agent’s use of force,
373
 or occur in custody, 
attract the strongest procedural obligation,
374
 and where multiple deaths form part of a 
systemic failure to protect, for instance the deaths of multiple individuals detained by the 
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British military in Iraq, the extent of investigation must mirror this failure.
375
 In cases of 
systemic failure to ensure the rights to life and freedom from ill-treatment:
376
 
… an art 2 or art 3 investigation ‘is required in order to maximise future 
compliance with those articles’. The purpose … is neither purely 
compensatory nor purely retributive; nor is it necessarily restricted to what 
has happened to the particular victim … It is to inform the public and its 
government about what may have gone wrong in relation to an important 
civic and international obligation and about what can be done to stop it 
happening again. 
As refined in the case-law, the principles determining the extent of investigation indicate that, 
contrary to the High Court’s holding, a full public inquiry is indeed required by the Mousa 
allegations. Consequently, the disparity illustrates key issues in the procedural duty’s extra-
territorial application. The following cases demonstrate this proposition. 
R (AM) v Secretary of State for the Home Department arose from allegations that immigration 
detainees in United Kingdom immigration detention facilities had suffered ill-treatment 
contrary to art 3.
377
 The issue on appeal was whether the availability of tort proceedings, a 
possible criminal investigation and Home Office Report satisfied, individually or collectively, 
satisfied the art 3 procedural obligation.
378
 Sedley LJ stated that procedural obligation’s case-
specific nature meant an investigation sufficient for single instances of ill-treatment is 
inadequate to address multiple and systemic breaches of art 3.
379
 The question for the court 
was “whether the entirety of what [the claimants] have now brought to the court’s attention 
requires, or at some point required, the Home Secretary to set up an inquiry.”
380
 After 
discussing the ECtHR jurisprudence, Sedley LJ cast doubt on the proposition that wider 
political matters fall outside the procedural duty and concluded that the procedural duty could 
extend “well beyond the ascertainment of individual fault and reach questions of system, 
                                                            
375
 Allen v Chief Constable of the Hampshire Constabulary [2013] EWCA Civ 967 at [43]; R (JL) v Secretary of 
State for Justice, above n 367, at [31]; R (JL) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWHC 2558 
(Admin), [2006] Inquest LR 200 at [32]. 
376
 R (AM) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA 219 at [57]; R (Wright) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2001] EWHC Admin 520, [2001] UKHRR 1399 at [43(2)]. 
377
 R (AM) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 376, at [7]. 
378 At [31] per Sedley LJ. 
379
 At [33] per Sedley LJ. 
380
 At [35] per Sedley LJ. 
49 
 
management and institutional culture.”
381
 In light of the systemic issues raised by the 
claimants, the Secretary of State’s failure to order an independent inquiry breached art 3 but, 
in light of the likely expense and passage of time, Sedley LJ declined to make a mandatory 
order, instead granting declaratory relief.
382
 Longmore LJ agreed with Sedley LJ’s explication 
of principle but disagreed with its application to the facts at hand.
383 
R (P) v Secretary of State for Justice concerned a prisoner who seriously and repeatedly self-
harmed and on whose behalf it was argued arts 2 and 3 imposed a duty to conduct an inquiry 
into his treatment and detention conditions.
384
 The Court of Appeal refused to order an 
inquiry as all the relevant facts were established, but agreed that an inquiry is required under 
art 3 where this is not the case and “good reason” is shown, including the need for 
investigation of systemic issues.
385
 In so holding, the Court of Appeal agreed with the 
Longmore LJ’s judgment in AM that the question whether a public inquiry is required is 
highly dependent on nature of the alleged breaches of art 3.
386
 These cases indicate that the 
fact-specific nature of the investigative duty should respond to the allegations in Mousa, 
concerning as they do systemic violations of arts 2 and 3, with a full public inquiry.
387
 
The High Court has elsewhere noted the suitability of the public inquiry, and its victim-
oriented objectives, to investigations into allegations of extensive rights violations. R (Keyu) 
v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs concerned the historical claim 
brought by witnesses and survivors of the fatal shooting of 24 civilians by British soldiers in 
the State of Selangor (now Malaysia), at the time a British Protected State, in 1948.
388
 The 
claimants, also comprising relatives of the deceased, sought judicial review of the 
Government’s 2010 and 2011 decisions to not establish a public inquiry into the killings, and 
correspondingly requested a mandatory order from the High Court against the Government to 
establish a public inquiry.
389
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In rejecting the claim, the High Court referred to the six objectives of public inquiries 
outlined above and commented on their applicability to the claimants’ allegations.
390
 To 
refresh, the six purposes are: (i) establish the facts; (ii) learn from events; (iii) provide 
therapeutic exposure and catharsis; (iv) rebuild confidence and provide reassurance; (v) 
retribution, blame, and accountability; (vi) and political considerations.
391
 Regarding 
objectives (i) and (ii), the High Court held that, given the passage of time, a public inquiry 
could not helpfully determine the facts or improve military procedures to prevent a 
recurrence.
392
 On objective (iii), the High Court acknowledged the importance of truth, 
reconciliation and provision of a forum in which the victims’ voices could be heard, but 
considered these objectives could only be fulfilled where the facts could be definitively 
established.
393
 Regarding objective (iv) the High Court stated that if the facts surrounding the 
killings could be established, “this might be a very powerful factor going to public 
confidence in the British Army”.
394
 As well, an inquiry could contribute to restoring public 
confidence and the impartiality and fairness of investigations.
395
 Ultimately, these purposes 
were undermined by the difficulty in adequately determining the facts. 
Though obiter, the High Court’s remarks are judicial acknowledgment of the importance of 
restorative justice objectives to investigations into rights violations in conflict. This 
affirmation of the importance of truth, reconciliation and voice indicates support in the case 
law for victim-oriented investigative processes, and their incorporation in the procedural duty 
in appropriate cases. 
In relation to the suitability of a public inquiry, and again contrary to the High Court’s 
holding in Mousa, there is also clear authority supporting greater legal representation 
enabling participation by the next of kin in investigations under arts 2 and/or 3. In R 
(Humberstone) v Legal Services Commission, the Court of Appeal clarified the procedural 
duty’s requirement that next of kin are involved to the “extent necessary to protect their 
legitimate interests.”
396
 The Court of Appeal held that the State is obliged to provide legal 
representation “where it is likely to be necessary to enable the next of kin to play an effective 
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part in the proceedings”, itself dependent on the facts of each case.
397
 I would argue that the 
Iraq investigations trigger the claimants’ legitimate interests, and legal representation is 
necessary as a “vital safeguard against dynamics which inherently tend toward 
internalisation.”
398
 As well, the Court of Appeal has previously affirmed the notion that, 
where the process of inquiry involves the next of kin, it served the functions of “learning, 
discipline, catharsis and reassurance.”
399
 
For reasons of practicality and expediency the High Court in Mousa No 2 chose to forego the 
public inquiry and exclude victim-oriented elements like greater participation or legal 
representation. As demonstrated, there exists clear principle in the case law to support 
implementation of a wider model of investigation. I argue that the High Court’s less 
ambitious model is driven by a judicial reticence to order an investigation that would 
inevitably encompass wider political matters. Accordingly, the flexible nature of the 
procedural duty allowed the High Court to calibrate the purposes of investigation to focus 
narrowly on the judicially amenable determination of individual accountability. 
This is illustrated by reference to the cases from Iraq concerning deaths and ill-treatment. In 
R (Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence the claimant contended that the inquest into the 
death of her son by heat stroke while serving in Iraq did not satisfy art 2’s procedural duty.
400
 
The United Kingdom Supreme Court, in a pre-Al-Skeini climate, held that Private Smith was 
outside the United Kingdom extra-territorial jurisdiction for the purposes of the ECHR.
401
 
Nevertheless, in considering the procedural duty Lord Phillips, with whom the majority 
agreed, made indicated that wider matters fall within the procedural duty. In discussing the 
appropriate subject matter of coroner’s inquests vis-à-vis public inquiries, Lord Phillips noted 
that inquests appropriately investigate single deaths but, where the art 2 duty “extends to 
considering the competence with which military manoeuvres have been executed, a coroner’s 
inquest cannot be the appropriate medium for inquiry.”
402 
The majority followed Lord 
Phillips on this point. Importantly, it demonstrates both the individualised focus of inquests 
and the Supreme Court’s view that, though inquests cannot investigate these matters, they 
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nevertheless fall within the procedural duty and require investigation by a suitable 
mechanism, for instance a public inquiry. 
Lord Rodger’s antithetical opinion on this point usefully illustrates the flexibility in the 
investigative duty which allows a measure of judicial discretion as to the scope of 
investigation ordered. Lord Rodger stated that wider questions, such as the provision of more 
effective military equipment, “all raise issues which are essentially political rather than 
legal”, and to be determined by Parliament.
403
 This is a classically deferential viewpoint that 
reduces the procedural duty to the narrow objective of determining individual accountability. 
As wider matters are for Parliament, the scope of any investigation legitimately ordered by 
the courts is correspondingly narrowed.
404
 Lord Rodger’s view demonstrates the scope open 
to judges when determining whether particular wider systemic matters are caught by the 
investigative duty – “[w]here the line is drawn is a matter of fact and degree”,
405
 thus 
permitting judges to calibrate the line’s position in each case. 
Additionally, both the High Court and Court of Appeal decisions in Mousa (No 1) 
demonstrate that Lord Rodger’s is not the predominant approach and provide further 
indication a larger public inquiry is required by the Iraq claims. First, though the High Court 
in Mousa (No 1) declined a public inquiry, it nevertheless considered wider matters of 
systemic abuse to fall within the procedural duty, and “so closely related to the circumstances 
of the individual allegations of abuse … as to be capable of falling within the scope of the 
investigative obligation under article 3.”
406
 Accordingly, questions of training and policy 
were not “matters for wider debate falling outside the scope of art 3.”
 407 
Second, and contrary 
to Lord Rodger’s characterisation, the High Court held that the question of a public inquiry’s 
necessity in a given case is one of law, not fact, stating that “it is ultimately for the court to 
decide whether article 3 requires a public inquiry” and “we doubt whether the Secretary of 
State can be strictly be said to enjoy a margin of appreciation in the matter.”
408
 
The Court of Appeal affirmed this point, that the decision to order a public inquiry is one of 
law, not fact, in its opening paragraph.
409
 Of course, this principle still allows considerable 
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judicial discretion. As discussed above, the Court of Appeal’s judgment also demonstrates 
the necessity of a public inquiry for the eventual totality of the Iraq claims. The Court of 
Appeal held that the Baha Mousa Inquiry was incapable of addressing systemic issues and 
making recommendations relating to the “present allegations which cover the whole period 
from 2003 to 2008 in a number of different locations.”
410
 Second, and most significantly, the 
Court of Appeal stated that the Baha Mousa Inquiry:411 
… would not and could not satisfy the Article 3 investigative obligation in 
relation to later allegations spreading over several years in various locations 
involving different units. 
From this case law it becomes apparent that, if not a full public inquiry, a wider form of 
investigation was necessitated by the quantity and nature of allegations in Mousa. That is, the 
nut to be cracked in this case required a (victim-friendly) sledgehammer. Therefore, I would 
argue that the High Court’s decision in Mousa (No 2) to refuse a public inquiry, while 
permissible as a matter of public law, was driven by judicial concern at the politically 
contentious subject matter that would inevitably be raised by a full public inquiry into the 
British military’s conduct during the whole period of occupation in Iraq. One may not agree 
with this, or place greater weight on the High Court’s concerns regarding expenditure and 
delay. In either case, this illustrates the second tension created by the investigative duty’s 
extra-territorial application. Domestic courts are applying a mechanism to circumstances in 
which wider “political matters” are inevitably raised. This in turns foregrounds the procedural 
duty’s underlying fall-back principle that the appropriate form of investigation in each is not 
prescriptive – “[s]o long as the minimum standards are met, it is for the state to decide the 
most effective method of investigating.”
412
 In the Iraq cases, the operation of this principle is 
to foreground determinations of individual accountability over victim-oriented objectives. 
VII Conclusion 
This paper has explored the purposes and rationales of the ECHR’s duty of effective 
investigation in the context of its extra-territorial application to allegations of severe rights 
violations by British soldiers in Iraq. It has demonstrated that the standards of investigation 
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imposed by the procedural duty in conflict remain high, thus offering potentially strong 
protection and affirmation of individual’s whose art 2 and/or 3 rights have been violated. 
Nevertheless, this paper has also shown that the procedural duty is comparatively deficient 
regarding account for principles of victims’ rights and restorative justice, arguably called for 
by the Iraq claims. This deficiency is exacerbated when the procedural duty is applied by 
domestic courts.  
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